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This discussion paper is based on a public speech 
delivered by the Hon. Patrick Nisira MHR, the Vice-
President of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, 
which was organised by the State, Society & Govern-
ance in Melanesia Program of the Coral Bell School 
of Asia Pacific Affairs, ANU College of Asia and the 
Pacific on 28 April 2016.
The subject of the leadership challenges facing 
the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) 
is an important one, especially with the referendum 
on the possible independence of Bougainville fast 
approaching (it must be held no later than mid-
2020). Leadership challenge is a subject that raises 
key issues about the central roles for the Autono-
mous Bougainville Government (ABG) envisaged 
by the Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA). Many 
of the ABG’s leadership challenges are inherent in 
the general situation of Bougainville in 2016. In a 
real sense it is a ‘post-conflict’ situation — in that 
Bougainville’s violent, destructive and deeply divi-
sive nine-year civil war (1988–97) ended almost 
19 years ago now, in mid-1997. But of course, divi-
sions, tensions and various forms of conflict (some-
times localised violence) continue. This complex 
ongoing and endlessly changing situation presents 
constant challenges for leadership at all levels, 
including for the ABG.
There are, however, some critically important 
ABG leadership roles intended by the BPA. The 
reasons for, and the nature and significance of, 
these roles are best understood by reference to the 
deeply divided conflict situation in Bougainville in 
the mid-1990s, in the several years before the peace 
process began. 
Context — the ABG, Reconciliation and 
Unification 
The ‘moderate’ leadership on both sides of the 
main divide within Bougainville had by the mid-
1990s become increasingly conscious of the long-
term dangers for Bougainville if violent conflict 
between Bougainvilleans continued. Any dreams of 
self-determination for Bougainville would be under 
grave threat.
Against that background, it should be no 
surprise that from the very beginning of the peace 
process, the focus amongst the Bougainville leaders 
committed to the process was on unification 
of Bougainville. It was for that reason that the 
first step was the extended meeting of opposing 
Bougainvillean leaders in the Burnham One talks 
in New Zealand in mid-1997. And of course, those 
talks were in fact a resumption of the previous talks 
between the divided Bougainville leadership held 
in Cairns, Australia, in September and December 
1995, initiated largely by Theodore Miriung, 
then premier of the Bougainville Transitional 
Government (BTG).
The deep drive for unification was always in 
large part directed to replacing the parallel and 
opposing Bougainville government structures gen-
erated by the conflict. The Bougainville Revolution-
ary Army had its associated ‘civilian’ government, 
the Bougainville Interim Government (or BIG), 
headed by Francis Ona. The BIG had its own sys-
tem of local-level government — a three-tier sys-
tem of Councils of Chiefs. Opposing them were 
the Bougainville Resistance Forces (or BRF) and, 
from 1995, the Bougainville Transitional Govern-
ment. The BTG began establishing its own system 
of local-level government in 1996, the Councils of 
Elders. There were even separate women’s organisa-
tions associated with the BIG/BRA, 
and the BTG/BRF, respectively.
So it is not surprising, perhaps, 
once the Burnham One talks saw 
the opposing leadership agree to 
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work together for peace, that in the January 1998 
Lincoln Agreement they agreed with the Papua 
New Guinea government on the need for ‘free and 
democratic elections on Bougainville to elect a 
Bougainville Reconciliation Government before the 
end of 1998’. 
Through 1998 and 1999 a great deal of effort 
went into achieving the much sought after Bou-
gainville Reconciliation Government. Indeed, 
the pursuit of that goal itself became divisive. In 
1995, the Organic Law on Provincial Government, 
which came into effect in April 1977 and under 
which provincial governments had operated in all 
provinces, had been repealed and replaced by a 
new Organic Law on Provincial Governments and 
Local-level Governments in the rest of PNG, while 
the 1977 Organic Law on Provincial Government 
continued to operate in Bougainville under special 
and temporary provisions applicable only to Bou-
gainville. The reason for this special treatment was 
that in 1995–96 then PNG Prime Minister Chan 
was exploring with the BTG the possibility of spe-
cial autonomy for Bougainville under the 1977 
Organic Law as a way of ending the conflict. 
This temporary provision for Bougainville 
that kept the previous Organic Law in force and 
provided for the operation of the BTG was due 
to expire on 31 December 1988. In late 1998, 
efforts were being made to not only continue the 
operation of the 1977 Organic Law in Bougainville 
but also to amend that Law to provide a basis 
for the reconciliation government. When those 
efforts unexpectedly failed, the 1995 Organic 
Law on Provincial Governments and Local-level 
Governments began operating in Bougainville 
from 1 January 1999. That should have resulted in 
the replacement of the BTG by a newly established 
and constituted Bougainville Interim Provincial 
Government (BIPG) headed by then Bougainville 
regional MP, John Momis, as governor. BIG/BRA 
leaders, and others, saw this as contrary to the 
Lincoln Agreement commitment to establishing 
a Bougainville Reconciliation Government. As a 
result, the national government was persuaded to 
suspend the BIPG from the instant that the 1995 
Organic Law came into operation in Bougainville 
on 1 January 1999.
That allowed the establishment in the first half 
of 1999 of an elected Bougainville People’s Congress 
(or BPC), without a basis in legislation. The inten-
tion was that the BPC would be the Bougainville 
Reconciliation Government. But of course, those 
who had hoped Momis would become governor 
were upset by the suspension action, and the estab-
lishing of the BPC, especially when former senior 
BIG leader, Joseph Kabui, was elected BPC President.
These problems in implementing the Lincoln 
Agreement provisions for a Bougainville Reconcili-
ation Government, meant that far from unifying 
and reconciling, the process was itself divisive. As a 
result, when the negotiations for a ‘comprehensive 
political agreement’ (also required by the Lincoln 
Agreement) began on 30 June 1999, those sup-
porting Momis and the establishment of the BIPG 
refused to participate.
It was the combination of a range of efforts 
from mid-1999 to achieve a reconciliation amongst 
the divided leadership, and a PNG Supreme 
Court decision late in 1999 that saw a remarkable 
compromise agreement. The BIPG would operate 
as the legal government for Bougainville, but would 
make all decisions in consultation with the ‘extra-
legal’ BPC. 
So, from late 1999, leadership was shared, 
between Governor Momis and President Kabui. 
Though the term used in the Lincoln Agreement — 
the Bougainville Reconciliation Government — was 
never applied to this unique, ad hoc arrangement, 
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it was truly a ‘reconciliation government’. It brought 
together previously opposing factions and oppos-
ing leaders in creative, flexible and highly inclusive 
arrangements that worked.
It was this set of arrangements for the ‘recon-
ciliation government’ that provided leadership and 
government for Bougainville until the ABG was 
elected in June 2005. Reflecting the agreed arrange-
ments for cooperation of the BPC and the BIPG, 
Momis and Kabui jointly led the combined Bou-
gainville negotiating team that from December 1999 
negotiated for the BPA, signed on 30 August 2001.
The successful operation of these ‘reconciliation 
government’ arrangements undoubtedly provided 
the firm foundations necessary for the ABG to 
become the true, long-term ‘reconciliation govern-
ment’ for Bougainville. 
These ad hoc arrangements were actually far 
more inclusive, and reconciliatory, than the single 
elected Bougainville Reconciliation Government 
envisaged by the Lincoln Agreement could ever 
have hoped to be. On the other hand, the flexible 
arrangements were expensive and unwieldy. They 
involved cooperation — inclusive of semi-regular 
joint meetings — between the elected BPC of more 
than 100 members, and the appointed BIPG of 
more than 30. 
But the result was direct involvement of many 
people from multiple previously opposing groups, 
and a long period during which they learned to 
work together and to trust one another. Together 
they oversaw the negotiations for the BPA. They 
jointly took ownership of that agreement once it 
was signed, and they oversaw its implementation. 
They worked together to establish the ABG.
The ABG’s Wider Leadership Roles 
Of course the BPA intends the ABG to be far more 
than just a symbol of reconciliation and unification. 
It is also intended to unify Bougainvilleans and work 
to meet the special needs of Bougainville through 
the way in which it governs Bougainville, under the 
complex constitutional arrangements for the auton-
omy promised by the BPA, implemented through 
the changes to the PNG constitution, and given an 
institutional basis in the Bougainville constitution. 
The BPA states that autonomy (amongst other 
things) is intended to:
(a)  facilitate the expression and development 
of Bougainville identity and the relation-
ship between Bougainville and the rest of 
Papua New Guinea;
(b)  empower Bougainvilleans to solve their 
own problems, manage their own affairs 
and work to realize their own aspirations 
…;
(c) promote the unity of Papua New Guinea;
(d)  provide for a democratic and accountable 
system of government for Bougainville 
that meets internationally accepted stand-
ards of good governance, including the 
protection of human rights.
Under the BPA, the ABG has extensive powers and 
resources made available to it, intended to enable it 
to not only develop the policies and laws needed to 
solve the problems and realise the aspirations of all 
Bougainvilleans, but also implement those policies 
and laws so as to make real differences in the lives 
of all Bougainvilleans. The powers and functions 
only made ‘available’ to the ABG rather than auto-
matically transferred by the constitution when the 
ABG was established because for the most part the 
powers in question had previously been exercised 
only through PNG Public Service Units, mainly 
located in the capital, Port Moresby. In the absence 
of units of national government departments based 
in Bougainville that could simply be transferred to 
ABG control, the BPA and the constitutional provi-
sions implementing it had to provide for not just 
the transfer of powers to the ABG, but also the 
development of capacity within the ABG to effec-
tively administer and exercise each of the powers or 
groups of powers. 
In addition, under the BPA and the constitu-
tional laws that give effect to it, it is the ABG which 
speaks on behalf of all Bougainvilleans in dealing 
with the PNG government, and also with the inter-
national community. As a result, the ABG has been 
vested with a range of little known ‘international 
affairs related powers’ and functions. For example, 
it has various rights to: 
• deal directly with foreign donor governments 
• take part in regional meetings and organisations 
of clear special interest to Bougainville 
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• be represented in negotiation of border agree-
ments between PNG and Solomon Islands 
• participate in international cultural exchanges, 
trade and tourism promotion, and sport.
Finally, it is the ABG that has authority, on behalf 
of all Bougainvilleans, to oversee the preparations 
for a most significant act of self-determination — 
the referendum on the future political status of 
Bougainville (which must include a choice of inde-
pendence), which must be held before mid-2020. 
Under the BPA and the constitutional laws 
giving effect to it, the ABG and the national gov-
ernment must cooperate in ensuring that the ref-
erendum is conducted. Further, it is the two gov-
ernments that must consult and agree on the key 
aspects of the referendum arrangements that the 
BPA leaves to be decided as the referendum date 
approaches. These aspects include:
• deciding on and establishing the agency with 
responsibility to conduct the referendum
• the criteria for enrolment of non-resident Bou-
gainvilleans as voters in the referendum
• the date of the referendum
• the question or questions to be asked in the 
referendum.
In summary then, the key leadership roles of the 
ABG include reconciliation and unification of Bou-
gainville, using its powers and resources to make 
and implement policies and laws that deal with the 
problems and realise the aspirations of Bougain-
villeans, speaking for them in dealings with the 
PNG national government and the international 
community, and acting in their interests in prepar-
ing for their act of self-determination, in the form 
of the referendum.
Finally, the Bougainville constitution spells out 
these and other leadership roles of the ABG, often 
in detail. The draft Bougainville constitution was 
developed between October 2002 and July 2004 
through a highly participatory process conducted 
by the 24-member Bougainville Constitutional 
Commission. It involved several rounds of public 
consultation about successive drafts of the constitu-
tion. The final draft was then submitted — together 
with a more than 300-page explanatory report — 
to the Bougainville Constituent Assembly.  The 
assembly comprised the almost 150 members of the 
BPC and the Bougainville Interim Provincial Gov-
ernment, sitting as a joint body. The assembly made 
very limited changes to the draft before adopting 
it in November 2004, and it was endorsed by the 
National Executive Council a few weeks later.
The Bougainville constitution clearly reflects 
the views and aspirations of the Bougainville people 
in setting significant goals for the ABG. For exam-
ple, the Preamble commits the ABG to:
• work to ‘provide for self-determination … 
through both autonomy arrangements and the 
referendum on independence’
• ‘recognize the sovereignty of the People’
• ‘recognize the autonomy of family and clan lin-
eages and other customary communities’
• ‘govern through democracy, accountability, 
equality, and social justice’
• ‘protect the land, the sea, our environment and 
our cultural identity for present and future 
generations’
• ‘strive to eliminate universal problems in 
Bougainville of poverty, illiteracy, corruption, 
pollution, unemployment, overpopulation and 
other ills’.
A full reading of the Bougainville constitution 
highlights other roles and goals for the ABG, seen 
especially in the detail of the Bougainville Objec-
tives and Directive Principles (sections 11–39 of 
the constitution), largely an elaboration of the main 
points that I have already highlighted.
I must, however, highlight one fundamentally 
important goal that the constitution emphasises the 
ABG must pursue. It is the ‘aim to achieve fiscal 
self-reliance [for Bougainville] as soon as possible’ 
(section 153(1)(a)). The constitution also directs 
that ‘the need to achieve fiscal-self reliance as soon 
as possible’ must be considered by the ABG when 
determining what functions and powers it seeks 
transferred from the national government.
Leadership Challenges Facing the ABG
I turn now to the question of the leadership 
challenges facing the ABG in carrying out the 
roles given to it, and the goals it has been asked 
to pursue. It is to be expected that there are 
many challenges inherent in its remarkable range 
of leadership roles. I will survey briefly survey 
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14 areas of particular challenge, and of special 
importance to the future of Bougainville.
1. Factions, Divisions and Mistrust
It is hardly surprising, in the aftermath of such 
a violent, bitter and divisive conflict, that many 
opposing factions and divisions exist in Bougain-
ville, and that consequentially, there is still much 
mistrust. Many of the issues here involve some con-
tinuity with problems that occurred during the vio-
lent conflict, 1988–97. But there are also significant 
new developments. I will mention just a few.  
While the ‘mainstream’ former Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army (BRA) and BRF elements that 
supported the peace process now largely work well 
together, at the local level there remain many unre-
solved divisions, where reconciliation is still required. 
While the BRA and the BRF no longer exist 
as armed ‘militias’, since about 2010, former com-
batant organisations have emerged as significant 
political voices in Bougainville. To some extent this 
development reflects uncertainty for some former 
senior leaders about whether President Momis, 
elected in mid-2010, was too much a PNG nation-
alist, and not sufficiently committed to holding the 
referendum. While that concern has now reduced 
significantly, I think it contributed to a number of 
pressures that saw the former combatants become 
more politically active. 
A complicating factor here is the various busi-
ness and other economic interests of several key 
former combatant leaders. Some of them use their 
ex-combatant networks to advance such interests.
Of course, there are other sources or 
manifestations of significant division and tension. 
They include:
• Several different Me’ekamui factions, none of 
which participated in the weapons disposal pro-
cess under the Peace Agreement, and so remain 
in possession of numerous firearms. These fac-
tions include:
• The Me’ekamui Government of Unity, based 
at Panguna, its leaders having links with sev-
eral small, but high risk, mining investors.
• The ‘original’ Me’ekamui, led by Chris Uma, 
based in Arawa, and controlling the Morgan 
Junction road block, still sometimes limiting 
access to the Panguna area.
• Damien Koike’s Me’ekamui group based 
mainly at Sinimi and at Tonolei Harbour in 
the Konnou area of south-eastern Buin, who 
operates a semi-industrial ‘artisanal’ mining 
operation engaging about 300 young males 
mainly from Buin, but also from other areas.
• Noah Musingku’s U-Vistract scheme, a fraudu-
lent investment scheme that began in Port 
Moresby in 1998, but which since late 2003 
has been based at Tonu in the Siwai area, and 
is ‘protected’ by about 100 young armed men, 
headed by a former Fijian soldier.
• Former BRA leader, Sam Kauona, who has long 
had interest in establishing mining operations 
in association with dual Australian/Canadian 
citizen, Lindsay Semple, and who — whenever 
they fear their mining interests are not suffi-
ciently guaranteed — attacks the ABG as being 
under the control of Bougainville Copper Ltd 
(or BCL) and its 53 per cent majority share-
holder, Rio Tinto.
2. Weapons Disposal
The peace agreement contained a plan for the BRA, 
BRF and Me’ekamui groups to disarm, but as we 
have seen, the Me’ekmui people did not join the 
process and retained their weapons. The agreed 
plan was implemented under United Nations (UN) 
supervision, resulting in destruction of about 2000 
weapons. The BPA gave BRA and BRF members 
strong incentives to dispose of weapons through 
provisions linking UN certification of adequate 
completion of particular stages in the disposal pro-
cess to the coming into operation of the constitu-
tional laws giving effect to the agreement, and the 
holding of the first ABG elections. 
But some weapons possessed by BRA com-
manders were not destroyed, and were later put 
to use in localised armed conflict in the Konnou 
area of southeast Bougainville, 2006–11, in which 
scores of people were killed. In addition, some 
BRA and BRF members retained weapons, due 
to suspicion of PNG or of one another, or for the 
purpose of sale, or for use in criminal activities. 
Further, since implementation of the weapons plan 
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ended, in 2005, additional weapons have come into 
the possession of some Bougainvilleans. Though 
exact numbers are not known, they include: some 
weapons brought in from Solomon Islands, prob-
ably some hundreds of refurbished World War Two 
weapons, and possibly some weapons supplied to 
former BRF members by contacts of theirs in the 
Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF). 
Not only have such weapons been used in 
localised conflict, they have also been employed in 
several instances of violent crime. Further, a signifi-
cant commercial trade in Bougainville weapons has 
emerged: both an especially lucrative trade into the 
PNG Highlands, but also a less lucrative internal 
Bougainville trade.
The ongoing availability of weapons under-
mines security, and is a constant threat to the 
strengthening of law and order. There are also 
growing fears that the presence of weapons could 
undermine the prospects of a free and fair self-
determination process, through the Bougainville 
referendum. Paradoxically, the approach of the 
referendum also provides us with the opportunity 
to encourage disposal of weapons. Many who have 
retained weapons claim to have done so for fear 
that the national government could not be trusted 
to allow the referendum to be held. Now that it is 
becoming clearer that this fear will not be realised, 
we are finding that Me’ekamui faction leaders and 
former BRA and BRF leaders are generally engag-
ing with the ABG about agreeing on a new disposal 
process that will make Bougainville weapons-free 
before the referendum is held.
3. Law and Order, and the Infant Bougainville 
Police Service
We face many difficulties in improving the law and 
order situation. While in general it is far and away 
much better than it was 19, or 10, or even 5 years 
ago, there is still much to be done. Contributing 
to the difficulties is the limited understanding and 
acceptance of ‘outside’ law, and also ‘outside’ law 
and justice institutions. 
Direct colonial administration in Bougainville 
began only in 1905, and was imposed with violence, 
and in a very uneven manner. Some areas had 
almost no administration contact until after World 
War Two. Even then, colonial administration in 
many areas was limited to occasional patrols.
So even before the conflict, in the 1970s and 1980s, 
in much of rural Bougainville, most of what we might 
classify as crime was dealt with by local clan leaders, 
broadly under ‘kastom’. Such matters were often seen 
as causes for concern because they could damage 
relationships, rather than because of ‘criminality’.
After the initial withdrawal from Bougainville 
of PNG security forces in March 1990, there were 
extended periods for most of Bougainville when 
‘outside’ law, and law and justice institutions, com-
pletely ceased to operate. While in some areas cus-
tomary leadership continued to deal with many of 
the same things that they had previously managed, 
in much of Bougainville even that leadership was 
severely disrupted, contributing to a situation close 
to anarchy. The impacts in terms of deaths, injuries, 
trauma and division were horrific.
Since the early 2000s there has been a signifi-
cant effort, mainly funded by Australian aid, and to 
a lesser extent New Zealand, to re-establish law and 
justice institutions. But unfortunately these changes 
have largely ignored the 2004 recommendations 
of the Bougainville Constitutional Commission. It 
held extensive public consultations around Bou-
gainville from late 2002 through 2003. This estab-
lished that there was strong community demand 
for a law and justice system quite different from 
that operating in the rest of PNG. Our people want 
a system reflecting the needs and special circum-
stances of Bougainville. 
The ABG remains committed to much more 
effort to develop appropriate policies and law and 
justice institutions. However, a major obstacle here 
is the limited capacity in the Bougainville Public 
Service and the still infant Bougainville Police Ser-
vice to undertake policy development work.
That leads me to the next area of leadership 
challenge for the ABG.
4. Capacity of the Bougainville Public Service and 
Bougainville Police Service
In general, the ABG faces grave difficulties because 
of the weakness in administration and policy devel-
opment capacity in both Bougainville’s public ser-
vice and police service. It was one of the great trag-
edies of the Bougainville conflict that the remark-
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able administrative, and emerging policy-making 
capacity of the North Solomons Provincial Gov-
ernment administration, built up over the 15 years 
from 1974, was almost entirely destroyed. It could 
not simply be re-established after the conflict. 
The very much weakened administration of the 
Bougainville Interim Provincial Government was 
taken over by the ABG in mid-2005. But during the 
conflict, management, planning and accountability 
mechanisms had been severely weakened. 
The capacity of the PNG police in Bougainville 
had been all but destroyed during the conflict, and 
a tiny group of officers concentrated in just two or 
three urban centres, and with very low morale, was 
all there was in 2003.
While significant efforts to rebuild the police, 
in particular, have been made, particularly in terms 
of recruiting and training new officers, many prob-
lems remain. They include orientation of the police 
(more towards urban-based reactive policing than 
community-based rural policing in cooperation 
with customary leaders), and grossly inadequate 
staffing of supervisory positions.
In terms of policy development, both the 
public service and the police service personnel are 
mainly trained to administer existing PNG public 
service and police programs. They have little or 
no experience or training in development of new 
policy intended to respond to the particular needs 
of Bougainville.
It is very difficult for the ABG to meet the BPA 
leadership challenge inherent in the goal of solving 
Bougainville’s problems and meeting the aspirations 
of Bougainvilleans when policy development capac-
ity is all but lacking.
We are working hard to respond to the prob-
lems here. In 2014, all public service functions 
and powers were transferred to the ABG, with our 
enactment of the Bougainville Public Service Act. 
We have since established our own new departmen-
talised structure. In the process we have raised the 
seniority and remuneration of most positions to 
make them more competitive, so as to attract senior 
applicants with experience in either public or pri-
vate sector positons elsewhere in Papua New Guin-
ea. The PNG departments of Finance and Person-
nel Management have been supportive in terms of 
funding the extra costs when calculating the annual 
Recurrent Unconditional Grant (which I will touch 
on a little more, shortly). 
We have since advertised all departmental 
head and constitutional office positions, and made 
a number of new appointments. The rest of those 
new positions should be filled soon. The next stage 
will be the advertising of the senior management 
positions in all departments. That will be followed 
by more junior positions. All positions are open 
— all current employees will have to compete. Our 
hope is that the end of 2016, a new and much lean-
er structure will be complete.
Will that result in major changes in capacity 
and performance? While that is our goal, there are 
still many serious obstacles, including the difficulty 
in attracting experienced and competent applicants 
willing to come to Bougainville when they know 
housing, education and health services are of such 
low standards compared to those available in major 
urban centres such as Moresby and Lae.
5. Transfer of Functions & Powers  
from the National Government to the ABG
While the BPA and the constitutional laws make a 
remarkably extensive range of functions and pow-
ers available to the ABG, there is a transfer process 
involved. It involves the ABG initiating the trans-
fer process by request to the national government. 
Negotiation is then required to develop necessary 
transfer plans within a year. The plans are required 
to take account of the need to build the necessary 
ABG capacity and provide it with the necessary 
financial resources to take over the functions and 
powers in question. 
The transfer process for many functions and 
powers has become bogged down in problems, mis-
understandings and inertia. In general, there has 
been a failure to address ABG capacity and resourc-
es needs.
There have also been some significant excep-
tions, including public service powers and mining. 
The much slower than anticipated progress in 
transfer of powers has resulted in frustration, and 
contributed to widespread criticism of the ABG for 
lack of performance, and failure to meet expectations.
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6. The Bougainville Economy, and that Fiscal 
Self-reliance Goal
The pre-conflict economy was dominated by the 
Panguna mine. Post-conflict, there are limited pos-
sibilities for dramatic expansion and development. 
The small-holder cocoa and, to a lesser extent, 
copra sectors have been re-established. But most 
plantations are worked only by informal settlers, 
with little incentive to invest in improvements. 
The only major new industry is small-scale gold 
mining, involving perhaps 10,000 miners (some full 
time, many more part time). They generate perhaps 
K100 million per year for miners.
There is undoubtedly scope for the expansion 
of agriculture — particularly through more efficient 
management. But despite claims to the contrary by 
some critics, there are also significant restrictions. 
Arable land is limited. We also face significant land 
shortages in many areas. Such shortages are a major 
factor in localised divisions and conflict. 
If the ABG is to achieve real autonomy, or to have 
independence available as a real option in the future, 
achieving fiscal self-reliance is essential. But the chal-
lenges of achieving that goal — so strongly empha-
sised by the Bougainville constitution — are immense. 
It is the need to explore realistic means of 
achieving that goal that has been a major factor 
leading the ABG to consider the possibility of per-
mitting strictly limited large-scale mining. How-
ever, any such mining must be on a dramatically 
different basis from the grossly unfair conditions 
under which Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) 
operated the Panguna mine — matters that I will 
discuss in more detail a little later.
There are critics of ABG mining policy. The 
main ones are a few noisy outsiders. They include 
the non-government organisation (NGO), Jubilee 
Australia, and close associates of Jubilee that post 
endless ‘anonymous’ postings on the ‘PNG Mine 
Watch’ and ‘PNG Exposed’ blogs. They refuse to, in 
any way, recognise the grave dilemmas facing the 
ABG in meeting its responsibilities to, on the one 
hand, manage mining development in a responsible 
way that takes account of the needs and concerns 
of both mining resource landowners and the wider 
population of Bougainville, and on the other hand 
to plan for the likelihood that a large proportion 
of Bougainvilleans will support the option of inde-
pendence for Bougainville when the referendum is 
held. They have no understanding of the realities of 
Bougainville and the complex leadership challenges 
facing us.
7. Revenue Raising — and Fiscal Self-reliance 
(Again!)
Fiscal self-reliance is at present nowhere in sight. 
Instead, the ABG is almost completely dependent 
on grants from the national government — and 
donor support. The ABG annual budget of more 
than K300 million per year is nowhere near enough 
to deliver reasonable levels of even the most basic 
services to our more than 300,000 people. Yet more 
than 90 per cent of that budget comes in the form 
of PNG grants and donor funds. 
The ABG raises less than K10 million per year 
through our own taxes (liquor licensing fees, sales 
tax on tobacco and alcohol, motor vehicle registra-
tion fees, and so on). 
Part of the national government funding is also 
derived from Bougainville — for we are supposed 
to receive all personal income tax collected in 
Bougainville. At present the payment is only K5 
million per year, and despite many requests for 
information on actual collections of that tax, we 
have no idea of actual figures. We are also entitled 
to just 30 per cent of PNG’s goods and services tax 
collected in Bougainville.
The mainstays of the Bougainville economy 
are small-holder cocoa and copra production, and 
small-scale gold production. The combined income 
from these sources in recent years averages K250 to 
a maximum of K350 million per year. 
We often consider possible imposition of ABG 
taxation on this income. But we are deeply con-
cerned about taking too much money from the lim-
ited income available to our people. 
In addition, we have to consider costs of col-
lection, and the difficulties likely to be created by 
emerging incentives for black markets. 
Probably our best option will be some form of 
indirect taxation on consumption (perhaps a sales 
tax additional to the GST imposed by the national 
government). But we know that there would be 
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considerable resistance to imposition of such an 
additional tax. Further, even an additional 10 per 
cent tax would be likely to generate a maximum of 
perhaps K50 million — nowhere near enough to 
bring us anywhere close to fiscal self-reliance.
Does anyone really question why each ABG 
since 2005, with the clear support of many, many 
Bougainvilleans, has been open to the possibilities 
of limited large-scale mining for a Bougainville that 
is committed to self-reliance as it seeks real auton-
omy, and prepares for an act of self-determination? 
What responsible government in our circumstances 
would not explore that possibility?
8. The Funding Arrangements in Support of 
Autonomy
The key aims of autonomy set out in the BPA 
extend beyond empowering Bougainvilleans to 
solve their own problems and work to realise their 
aspirations to also recognising the need for the 
ABG to have the resources needed to achieve those 
lofty ideals. So it states that the autonomy arrange-
ments are also intended to ‘provide sufficient per-
sonnel and financial resources for the autonomous 
Bougainville Government to exercise its powers and 
functions effectively’.
Unfortunately, the BPA never delivered fully on that 
aspect of its goals. That was largely because of the 
severe fiscal crisis that faced PNG in the years when 
the BPA was being negotiated — 1999–2001. That cri-
sis made it very difficult for the national government 
to accept Bougainville demands for generous funding. 
Of much greater concern is the failure of the 
national government to deliver even the inadequate 
levels of funding promised by the BPA and the con-
stitutional laws giving effect to it. I will not go into 
detail here. Instead, I will highlight two of the most 
serious sets of problems involved.
First, the main annual grant payable to the ABG 
is the Recurrent Unconditional Grant. It funds 
recurrent costs (salaries and operational costs) of 
ABG functions — both those inherited from the 
previous provincial government, and new ones 
taken on in the process of transfer of powers. 
Amongst many problems with calculation of 
the grant has been lack of attention to the costing 
of the expense to the ABG of transferred activities 
(a notable exception, however, being in relation to 
costs of the transfer of public service powers). 
Another problem has been the national gov-
ernment failure to extend to Bougainville the sig-
nificant benefits of new approaches to calculation 
of the similar grants payable to provincial govern-
ments elsewhere in PNG, as it is required to do by 
the BPA and section 48(2) of the Organic Law on 
Peace-building in Bougainville.
The second set of problems concerns calcula-
tion of the only other major annual grant payable 
to the ABG — the annual Restoration and Develop-
ment Grant (or RDG). Because of the fiscal crisis 
of the late 1990s and early 2000s, the RDG base 
amount was not high — just slightly more than 
the K10 million PNG Public Investment Program 
(or PIP) funds available for Bougainville in 2001. 
But in negotiating the annual RDG calculation 
arrangements, clear agreement was reached that 
when PNG’s then fiscal crisis was over, Bougainville 
would be guaranteed to share in increased tax rev-
enue, as represented by percentage increases in the 
annual PNG PIP. 
So provision was included that the annual RDG 
payable would not reduce below the 2001 base fig-
ure. It would only be adjusted upwards, by the roll-
ing average of the change in the PNG PIP in each of 
the five years prior to the year of grant. 
By 2005-06, as new resource projects came on 
stream in PNG and commodity prices rose, the 
annual increase in the PIP became large. Unfor-
tunately, although the national government did 
increase the RDG, to K15 million a year, it simply 
did not make the annual calculations required by 
the BPA and the Organic Law. RDG calculation 
became an ever more difficult source of contention 
between the governments. 
In 2010 and 2011, the ABG began doing what it 
should have done from 2005 — that is, it made its 
own calculations of the RDG amounts that should 
have been paid annually. These indicated that the 
annual amount payable was over K60 million (over 
four times more than the K15 million actually paid 
annually). Further, the unacknowledged and unpaid 
arrears amounted to over K200 million.
Since 2011 there have been increasingly acrimo-
nious exchanges over the issues here. They remain 
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unresolved. It is true that the national government 
has made other funds available, notably a Special 
Intervention Fund of K500 million for major infra-
structure to be made available at K100 million per 
year from 2011. So far only K300 million has been 
paid. It is most unlikely to be paid in 2016 due to 
the current fiscal crisis facing PNG. While payments 
received have been a welcome additional source of 
project funding, it is not the grant funding available 
to the ABG intended by the BPA.
Without the RDG paid at the constitutionally 
guaranteed levels, the ABG does not have available 
to it the necessary financial resources that the goals 
of the BPA indicated were necessary. In particular, 
because it was always understood that Recurrent 
Grant expenditure would be virtually tied to meet-
ing costs of existing services, the RDG would be the 
main source of ABG discretionary funds. 
In the absence of the correct levels of RDG, we 
in the ABG could be excused for feeling that our 
role has been reduced to little more than oversight 
of basic service delivery! So much for the goal of 
achieving self-determination through autonomy!
9. Accountability
Another tragedy of the Bougainville conflict was 
the severe undermining of the high standards of 
financial management and accountability that the 
previous North Solomons Provincial Government 
had developed. There is no doubt that financial 
management and accountability standards reduced 
dramatically during the 1990s. Corrupt practices 
crept in that are now difficult to eradicate. But their 
eradication is a major focus of the major reforms 
involved in the Bougainville Public Service. Corrupt 
officers will be replaced. Accountability mechanisms 
are being strengthened. Our new internal audit office 
established in 2015 is already having an impact. 
10. Deciding the Future of Panguna, or Further 
Large-scale Mining
A major set of issues challenging all three ABG 
presidents and their governments (the Kabui gov-
ernment elected in mid-2005, the Tanis govern-
ment elected in December 2008, and the Momis 
governments elected in 2010 and 2015) has 
involved questions about the future of large-scale 
mining. There are two distinct issues here. One is 
whether the Panguna mine should re-open. The 
second is whether any other large-scale mines 
should be permitted.
Some Bougainvilleans completely oppose either 
form of large-scale mining. But my strong impres-
sion from my wide travels and consultations all 
over Bougainville is that a solid majority is open to 
both possibilities. However, all insist that any new 
mining that occurs must be under a totally different 
set of conditions than those under which the colo-
nial regime imposed the Panguna mine’s operations 
on Bougainville. 
Further, most such Bougainvilleans are open 
to resumption of Panguna by BCL. That company 
clearly accepts responsibility for much of what went 
wrong in the 1980s. There is concern that a new 
mine operator may reject any responsibility for 
mine legacy issues.
The ABG has responded to demands that min-
ing only occur under new and fair conditions 
accepted by landowners. Its law provides that own-
ers of customary land also own all minerals on, in 
or under their land. Such rights are accompanied 
by landowner veto rights over either or both inten-
sive mineral exploration on their land, and/or the 
grant of licences for mining development.
As a result, neither Panguna nor any other 
mine will open in the future without landowner 
agreement. That will be determined by democratic 
associations representing the landowner communi-
ties. In the Panguna case, since 2011, the landowner 
communities in the areas of the former leases asso-
ciated with the mine (and some adjoining areas) 
have established nine associations. Executives for 
the associations were elected through general meet-
ings attended by a total of about 2500 landowners.
No decision about the future of Panguna has 
yet been made by those associations. Indeed, the 
ABG has not requested them to make any such 
decision. But solely at the initiative of a broadly 
representative meeting of over 50 senior land-
owner community leaders in July 2012, the ABG 
has worked with the associations towards holding a 
preliminary reconciliation (Bel Kol) with BCL. The 
aim in 2012 was to enable BCL to establish a pres-
ence in Bougainville needed to prepare for possible 
discussions about negotiations. 
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But there has been a hiatus since August 2014. 
ABG mining law stripped BCL of most of its tene-
ments. It was left only with an exploration licence 
over its former Special Mining Lease. The mining 
giant, Rio Tinto, 53.6 per cent majority shareholder 
in BCL, then decided to review its ‘investment’ in 
BCL. That resulted in most of the tentative steps 
towards possible negotiations being put on hold. 
Rio Tinto recently advised the ABG that its review 
may not be completed till late 2016.
In the meantime, additional complexity has 
resulted from a series of national government ini-
tiatives since 2014 to attempt to purchase the Rio 
Tinto 53.6 per cent equity in BCL. Together with its 
existing 19.3 per cent equity, that would make PNG 
72.9 per cent majority shareholder in BCL. The ABG 
is unclear why the national government has dem-
onstrated such determination in relation to the pur-
chase of the equity — though that has not prevented 
some speculation on the possible issues involved!
The president has consistently informed the 
prime minister, in the strongest terms, that these 
proposals are not acceptable to Bougainville. And 
that indeed, if implemented, the proposals would 
risk conflict. 
He has advised both the prime minister and 
Rio Tinto that if, as seems increasingly likely, Rio 
decides to end its involvement in BCL, then the 
Rio equity should be transferred to the ABG and 
former Panguna leases landowners, without pay-
ment. Further, Rio Tinto must take full responsibil-
ity for an environmental clean up and mine closure 
program that deals properly with the major mine 
legacy issues.
In relation to whether other large-scale mines 
should be permitted in Bougainville, the Bougain-
ville Mining Act provides several important protec-
tions. They protect not only landowners likely to 
be impacted by any particular project, but also the 
wider Bougainville community.
One protection is the adoption under the Act of 
the reservation of almost all of Bougainville (other 
than the BCL leases) from mining exploration and 
development, under the terms of a 1971 mining 
moratorium imposed by the colonial administra-
tion. That moratorium can only be lifted, wholly or 
in part, by the ABG Cabinet, but only after debate 
on the proposed decision in the ABG legislature. 
With the Bougainville mining department get-
ting ready to manage mining tenement applica-
tions, the ABG Cabinet decided in March 2016 
that in advance of even considering a decision on 
the future of the moratorium, there should be wide 
public debate on the issues involved. 
But with the ABG in fiscal crisis (because of 
PNG’s own fiscal crisis) we do not have the funds 
necessary for an extensive public awareness and 
consultation program. So as a substitute, we decid-
ed to initiate public debate through a two-stage 
debate in the ABG legislature. The first stage was a 
debate in early April 2016. When it was adjourned, 
all members were asked to consult their constitu-
ents on the issues involved, with a view to a debate 
with expanded scope at the next meeting of the 
House. Only after that will the Cabinet consider a 
possible decision on the future of the moratorium.
The president has publicly spelt out his view. He 
argues that the moratorium should be only partially 
lifted. That would provide ongoing protection to 
Bougainvilleans. It would also enable us to assess 
how well our new tenement administration system 
operates.
The other major protections under the Bou-
gainville Mining Act are first, the veto powers of 
landowners of any exploration or mining licence 
application and, second, the prohibition on the 
operation, at any time, of more than two very large 
mines. But a concern expressed by the president 
about possible full lifting of the moratorium is that 
there would be no limit on the number of smaller 
open-cut or underground mines (save to the extent 
that landowners veto such developments).
So I am sure you can see the extent of the lead-
ership challenges facing the ABG in relation to 
decisions on the future of Panguna and other large-
scale mines. 
11. Gender Equality
While most Bougainvillean language and culture 
groups adhere strongly to matrilineal descent prin-
ciples, this does not equate to anything like matriar-
chy. Males in the matrilineal societies are full mem-
bers of the same clan-based landowning groups 
that their mothers, sisters, and maternal aunts and 
nieces belong to. More important, it is males that 
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generally take on public roles of speaking for their 
lineage in decision-making about land — and about 
many other important matters at the ‘village-level’. 
Consequently, many Bougainvilleans tend to see lit-
tle basis for roles for women in public life outside 
the village.
The Bougainville constitution seeks equality for 
all, and fair representation of women on all consti-
tutional and other bodies. It also seeks recognition 
and encouragement of women’s roles in both ‘tra-
ditional’ and ‘modern’ Bougainville society. It spe-
cifically seeks development of those roles ‘to take 
account of changing circumstances’ (section 28).
It is difficult, however, to achieve rapid change 
to deeply ingrained cultural norms. For that reason 
alone, progress towards our constitutional goal of 
much greater gender equality has so far been slow. 
The first step — three reserved seats for women in 
the ABG House of Representatives, out of a total of 
40 seats — was a welcome signal of change. But it 
was far from a clarion call for real equality.
A strong move has recently been made, however, 
in that direction. This involves an ABG Cabinet deci-
sion on developing a new draft Community Govern-
ment Act. It should be ready for debate in the House 
in June. It involves a new local-level government sys-
tem, to replace the Council of Elders (or COE) sys-
tem set up under 1996 Bougainville legislation. 
By constrast with the COEs, which were made 
up mainly of unelected traditional leaders, com-
munity governments will comprise elected ward 
representatives.  Traditional leaders will continue 
their roles in village-level governments (to be called 
‘ward’ governments).
Each community government will have a mini-
mum of three and a maximum of 12 wards, and 
each ward will elect two members — one female and 
one male. Each community government will have a 
chair and a deputy chair. If the chair is a female, the 
deputy must be a male, and vice versa. Following the 
second community government general elections, 
the ‘gender of the member chosen as Chair … must 
not be the same as the gender of the person who was 
Chair immediately before the … election’. 
In this way, the Bougainville Community Gov-
ernment Bill, when enacted as law, will ensure 
not only that there are equal numbers of men and 
women elected to community governments, but 
also that, over time, women will have equal oppor-
tunity to hold the senior ‘executive’ positions in 
community governments. 
12. That Referendum on Bougainville’s Future 
Political Status
Little more needs to be said here about the refer-
endum, other than to emphasise that the ABG has 
heavy constitutional and political responsibilities in 
relation to the referendum preparations. It is now 
increasingly likely to be held in 2019. Following the 
conduct of the referendum, the ABG will need to 
shoulder even more significant responsibilities, in 
terms of negotiating with PNG on implementation 
of the outcome and managing the ensuing situation. 
13. Deeply Misleading Public Commentary
An unexpected challenge for the ABG has been the 
sometimes amazing extent of deeply misleading 
public commentary on Bougainville, the ABG, its 
mining policy, and related matters. This commen-
tary began mainly in 2012 as the ABG moved to 
develop its own mining laws. 
The main attacks have come from two sourc-
es. One involves small groups in Bougainville. 
The other is a closely linked external network. 
Their main ‘message’ is that — in some way never 
explained, and with no credible evidence ever pro-
vided — the ABG is under the control of, or part 
of a conspiracy with, Rio Tinto, BCL, Australia and 
PNG. This conspiracy (or so they say) is intended 
to force the re-opening of the Panguna mine against 
the united opposition of the people of Bougainville.
The small group inside Bougainville involves a 
few foreign ‘adventurers’ seeking control of mining 
resources. They do so by fostering links with Bou-
gainville factions, and using those links to obtain 
financial support from ‘high risk’ foreign investors. 
The ‘adventurers’ and their local supporters fear 
that ABG mining policy and legislation will limit 
their opportunities. 
The external network centres on British-based 
Australian academic activist Kristian Lasslett. His 
network comprises his close associates, including: 
the NGO, Jubilee Australia; the two blogs run by 
the PNG-based Bismarck Ramu Group — PNG 
Mine Watch and PNG Exposed; the Bougainville 
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Freedom Movement; a group of criminologists sup-
posedly studying ‘state crime’, calling itself the ‘State 
Crime Initiative’; and an Australian activist journal-
ist, Anthony Loewenstein. 
All network elements have their own ideologi-
cal positions that they project onto Bougainville. 
They do so with virtually no understanding of, or 
interest in, what is really happening in Bougainville. 
They do not need much in the way of evidence, 
mainly because they have no interest in understand-
ing our complex reality. Rather, they pick and choose 
a bit of information here, an opinion expressed 
there, and twist what little they have to fit their own 
preconceived theoretical or ideological position. 
The misinformation that they put out has very 
little impact in Bougainville. But the internal and 
external contributors are mutually reinforcing. The 
external network undoubtedly provides encourage-
ment to the foreign adventurers and their associates 
in Bougainville. 
The misleading commentary does also perhaps 
influence perceptions of Bougainville by unin-
formed observers outside Bougainville. So while 
not a major leadership challenge, it is certainly one 
that we would prefer to do without.
14. Information, Awareness and Public Consultation
The final leadership challenge I will mention 
involves the grave difficulties we face in providing 
accurate information to the people of Bougainville. 
Perhaps 90 per cent of Bougainvilleans live in 
mainly small, scattered hamlets in rural areas. Many 
are in remote areas, completely inaccessible by road 
or air. In our post-conflict situation, as we seek to 
implement the complex BPA and constitutional 
arrangements, it is very challenging indeed to get 
accurate and balanced information to our people.
The misleading commentary — especially that 
coming from what we might call the Lasslett net-
work — regularly attacks us for inadequate consul-
tation on mining policy and laws. Yet we have allo-
cated far more effort and resources to consultation 
on these issues than has ever been done elsewhere 
in PNG in relation to either mining or other policy 
issues — with the one, and truly remarkable, excep-
tion of  the pre-Independence consultation by the 
PNG Constitutional Planning Committee. That was 
under the leadership of current ABG President, 
John Momis, a truly committed advocate and prac-
titioner of public consultation.
What our uninformed critics fail to acknowl-
edge is the grave challenges involved in carrying 
out effective consultation in Bougainville’s situa-
tion. Radio coverage extends to about 30 per cent of 
Bougainville. Newspapers have limited reach. The 
cost of carrying out broad-based face-to-face con-
sultation is astronomical.
We are, however, working hard to improve our 
capacities in this regard. We are doing that with a 
particular eye to what we know will be the need 
for extensive public consultation on many aspects 
of referendum preparations and post-referendum 
decision-making. We have commissioned research 
on the ‘communication landscape’ in Bougainville. 
It involves a Bougainville Audience Study. That has 
included a survey of over 800 people in all our 13 
districts. It is providing data on how people gain 
access to information, what sources they regard as 
most reliable, their knowledge of key issues or con-
cepts such as autonomy, independence, referendum. 
With the help of the information and analysis 
provided by the report, we will analyse the possi-
bilities. We will seek PNG government and donor 
support to assist us in improving our consultation 
capabilities in advance of the referendum prepa-
rations. While undoubtedly the ABG faces many 
complex and difficult leadership challenges, we are 
facing them honestly. We constantly explore our 
best options for dealing with them. Although our 
resources are extremely limited, we work hard to 
change that situation, and to face our challenges 
head on.
Conclusion
While undoubtedly the ABG faces many complex 
and difficult leadership challenges, the foregoing 
discussion should shed some light on our efforts to 
face those challenges honestly, and to find realistic 
ways of dealing with them. Despite severely limited 
resources and capacity, we constantly explore 
the possibilities and the options for dealing with 
these and other challenges that face the leadership 
of the still very new government of autonomous 
Bougainville. The ABG leadership is unified in 
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working to change and improve the situation we are 
in, so that we are in a better position to face what 
will always be both a difficult and a changing set of 
leadership challenges.
Update
Amongst developments in the period between pres-
entation of the speech by Mr. Nisira (April 2016) 
and the preparation of the paper for publication 
(April 2017), developments that have occurred in 
relation to matters discussed in the paper include:
• Slower than expected implementation of the 
new Bougainville Public Service structures, 
largely due to a series of unexpected adminis-
trative problems. 
• Differences between the ABG and the national 
government over the calculation of grants pay-
able to the ABG have not been resolved, result-
ing in the ABG deciding in late 2016 to initiate 
court proceedings seeking interpretation by the 
PNG Supreme Court of the relevant constitu-
tional provisions on calculation of the Restora-
tion and Development Grant.
• In June 2016 Rio Tinto announced its decision 
to cease its ‘investment’ in BCL, and it trans-
ferred its 53.8 per cent equity to the ABG and 
the national government, but denied any further 
responsibility for mine closure of remedying of 
mine legacy issues. The ABG has publicly stated 
its determination to hold BCL accountable.
• The ABG’s Community Government Act was 
enacted in late 2016, and the first commu-
nity government elections under that Act are 
planned for April 2017.
• Preparations for the referendum on Bougain-
ville’s political future have made considerable 
progress since April 2016, with the Joint Super-
visory Body agreeing in May 2016 on a target 
date for the referendum of mid-2019, and also 
on the establishing of an independent Bougain-
ville Referendum Commission to conduct the 
referendum. Major agreements about establish-
ing the commission were signed by the two gov-
ernments in January 2017.
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